About 2/3 of the world’s exploration and mining companies are headquartered/listed in Canada. And increasingly, extractive companies (particularly those with some appetite for political risk) are searching and developing new resources in developing countries and frontier regions.

Over the past few years, the CSR discussions amongst Canadian (= mostly international) extractive sector and its stakeholders has moved forward. This includes shared expectations on key issues emerging from consultations held in 2006 (better known at the National Roundtables in Canada) which were memorialized in the attached consensus Advisory Group Report – March 2007 (PDF, 2.3 MB). The Canadian Government responded in March 2009 with the publication of a new CSR strategy ‘Building the Canadian Advantage: a CSR Strategy for Canadian International Extractive Sector’ (DFAIT_CSR-March2009, PDF, 483 KB). In this strategy, the Canadian Government announced that it will promote widely-recognized international CSR performance guidelines, including the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) for CSR reporting. It seems that some Canadian junior and mid-tier mining companies decided to kick start the process in a pro-active manner: they started reporting.

NovaGold produced its first sustainability report earlier this year. NovaGold s a pre-production mining company with interests in two of the world’s largest gold and copper-gold projects, a substantially constructed gold mine and other exploration-stage properties (Donlin Creek, Southwest Alaska; Galore Creek,  Northwest British Columbia;  Ambler , Northern Alaska; and Rock Creek, Northwest Alaska).  

Similarly, Osisko, which is also a pre-production mining company, published its 2009 sustainability report in line with the GRI reporting framework.  Osisko is currently building the Canadian Malartic gold mine in the Abitibi mining district. (Note: Osisko had already published its first, forward looking sustainability report for 2008 in 2009.)

Several weeks ago, Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited also made good on its promise to publish its first CSR report. AEM is a Canadian-based, mid-tier gold producer with mines in Canada, Finland and Mexico (LaRonde, Goldex, Lapa, Meadowbona all in Canada, Kittila Finalnd, Pinos Altos, Mexico).  This report – well – reports against the Mining Association of Canada’s  Towards Sustainabile Mining and the GRI reporting framework/indicators.

Red Back Mining, an emerging mid-tier, gold producer listed in Canada, published its inaugural 2009 sustainability report recently. Red Back’s mining operations are located in Ghana (Chirano) and Mauritania (Tasiast).  [Disclosure: I assisted with the production of this sustainability report.]

Also in 2010, Lundin Mining Corporation, a mid-tier, base metals mining company produced its first sustainability report in line with the GRI framework. Previously, Lundin Mining had already published a couple of annual CSR reports. Lundin Mining’s operations are located in Portugal, Sweden, Spain and Ireland. In addition, Lundin Mining holds a development project pipeline and an equity stake in Tenke Fungurume copper/cobalt project in the Democratic Republic of Congo. [Disclosure: I assisted also with the production of this sustainability report.]

Considering that we are still in the early part of the sustainability reporting season, all signs are that Octopus Paul may well be right – again! We should expect a new cohort of Canadian mining companies producing their first sustainability reports.

Do you think this will shift some of the inevitable comments on how first-timers should further improve their reporting practices to – instead – encourage those who remain ’free riders’ by not reporting to get on with it? Also, have you come across other new CSR and sustainability reporting efforts in the extractive sector? Kindly send us a link to these new reports.  

Mehrdad Nazari, Senior CSR, GRI & ESIA Advisor, PRIZMA (Blog: www.prizmablog.com, Web: www.prizmasolutions.com)

Those who have discovered the business case of sustainability reporting have probably realized that they are half way there before they even started. They see that, due to listing requirements, they have good governance and accountability structures already in place. They also have accounting and human resources departments, policies and practices in place – and already collect  a lot of useful data (and additional data could be collected with ease). ‘Tick off’ a bunch of GRI disclosure requirements and indicators. Many companies also have environmental, health & safety policies and management systems in place to enable regulatory compliance and support efforts aimed at continuous improvement. ‘Tick off’ a dozen or two additional GRI indicators. Add knowledge of industry-wide stakeholder engagement initiatives, and company/project specific stakeholder engagement/mapping (particulalry well developed in the extractive sector) and you have most – if not all – of the ingredients for a good GRI report in place. However, this information and related context and stories are perhaps confined within departmental silos and disbursed throughout the reporting organization. Pulling this data together is not a major problem.

Major costs associated with sustainability reporting – especially in the extractive/mining sector – is already ‘sunk cost.’ Most – if not all – the policies, activities, monitoring and stakeholder engagement which provide the platform for sustainability reporting are already in place. The reporting part is thus largely a marginal cost item.

Perhaps reporting could be compared to the top part of the floating ice berg: the visible part above the water line represents the smallest portion of the mass (in an ice berg it is about 1/8^th and for reporting, this would be a much smaller proportion). Sadly, most organizations have generated the mass of data and activities needed – now floating largely invisible below the water line  - but have failed to leverage that investment to also generate their first sustainability report.

So what drives the costs of inaugural sustainability reporting? Here I will briefly touch on capacity building, GRI Application Level, credibility and assurance , and desk-top publishing and disclosure.

Some investment in training and capacity building is often required for first time reporters. Options include attendance of “generic” GRI courses which were conceived for report coordinators. These courses do not cover GRI’s technical protocols or sector supplements in any great detail. This is one of the reasons first time reporters use experienced external consultants to coach them through their first report. Or they go through a couple of internal “mock reports” before finally getting up their courage to disclose their reports. The really worried types do both and – in the mining sector – still pray to Saint Barbara, the saint of miners, when disclosing their first report.

Another cost driver is the selection of the so called GRI Application Level. GRI requires that reporters should declare an Application Level (although some 25% of reporters in GRI’s 2009 database chose not to do so). These are designated A, B or C with a “+” if part/all the report/data was externally assured (a hotly debated topic which I will not address in this blog). The Application Levels reflect coverage of the GRI reporting framework, such as approach to management discussion and analysis, and number of Performance Indicators reported on.

The Application Level declaration appears to be creating psychological barriers to reporting. For many, the use of A, B and C conjures up images of school grades. Imagine the challenge of approaching your CEO and requesting resources to generate a sustainability report which targets ‘only’ a ‘C,’ an entry level advocated by GRI for first-time reporters (requiring only 10 indicators).

The approach to boost the credibility of the inaugural report can also become a cost driver. This is especially true if that that approach is – in my view – mistakenly equated to external assurance. External assurance, provided by the big four accounting firms and a few other niche providers, can become a major cost driver. First time reporters would be well advised to take a look at Tech, a mining and metals major, or other long-time reporters in their sector. Tech is an early adopter of GRI’s sustainability reporting framework and has produced annual sustainability report since 2001. However, Tech only used an “External Review” (a limited form of assurance) in 2007. There are many better – and typically more cost effective – ways to boost the credibility of inaugural reports. Acknowledging critical stakeholder voices and discussing challenges/failures in addition to including the obligatory picture of smiling school kids are amongts the most effective ones. And they are free of charge!

Other cost drivers include approach to report production, desk-top publishing and disclosure choices. Reporters will need to chose between “free” in-house drafting/editing and desk-publishing (and associated opportunity costs), and outsourcing. They will also need to consider if they want to invest in printing glossy reports or creating web-posted PDF report using recycled electrons.

Do these cost drivers resonate with you? Or have you come across more significant cost drivers for inaugural sustainability reporting which should be mentioned here?  Please share your comments and observations. For a related publication, please access also my publication Sustainability Reporting using GRI: Lessons Learned.

Mehrdad Nazari is a Senior CSR, GRI & ESIA Advisor at PRIZMA. He provides GRI-certified training courses and boot camps on sustainability reporting. He also assists junior and mid tier mining companies with their inaugural sustainability reportering effforts.

In her latest blog entitled “Is any report better than no report ?”, Elaine Cohen expertly dissected Perenco’s first CSR report. I will not add to that but prefer to speculate about drivers behind Perenco’s first  CSR report. As some of you will know, Perenco has been in the NGO advocacy news over the past couple of years, particularly with regard to its activities in Peru (see for example of article in the Guardian here). Some of Perenco’s activities appear to be linked to indigenous blockades in rainforest of Peru and heavy handed response by the Peruvian army – you get the picture. But my guess is that this may not have been the trigger of Perenco’s CSR reporting.

My money is on Perenco’s recent creation of a $2.8 billion reserve-based lending facility. This was set up to enable Perenco’s growth strategy, including completion of the above noted oil pipeline in Peru’s rainforests. According to an article in Legal Week,  law firms Herbert Smith and Allen & Overy have been advising on the creation of this lending facility, which is the largest ever of its kind. It is designed to enable the company to grow its business with new acquisitions and develop its current assets.

The Legel Week articles lists some of the banks involved in this lending facility. They include Societe Generale, Bank of Scotland, and a number of so called Equator Principles Financial Institutions:  Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ , BNP Paribas , Credit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank, Citibank, ING, Natixis, RBS, and Standard Chartered.

Many of these banks have adopted the Equator Principles, which means that they have adopted a set of voluntary standards for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing and are based on the IFC Performance Standards.

It would be interesting to hear how far these Equator Banks applied their environmental and social due diligence (including some of the banks’ own sector/topic policies) to look at Perenco’s projects which will be financed from the proceeds of the reserve-based lending facility.

I also wonder if the involvement of Equator Banks along with a likely and probably sustained barrage of advocacy NGO complaints (targeted at the banks) ‘pump primed’ Perenco’s CSR reporting journey. A look at Talisman Energy http://www.talisman-energy.com/, a Canadian independent oil company with operations in Peru which had its CSR reporting ‘wake up call’ in Sudan many years ago, may show some of the steps ahead. An example of their recent activities is research comissioned by Talisman is “Implementing a Corporate Free, Prior, and Informed Consent Policy: Benefits and Challenges report,” which can be accessed here. Today, Talisman is generally viewed as fully engaged with a variety stakeholders and has been producing excellent CSR reports (using GRI framework at A+level) for many years (along with underlying good performance).

What do you think were the main drivers of Parenco’s first CSR report?

Mehrdad Nazari (MBA, MSc, LEAD Fellow) is a Senior ESIA, CSR & Sustainability Reporting Advisor at PRIZMA  www.prizmasolutions.comand blogger http://www.prizmablog.com

As noted in a media release, the dispute reolution mechanism would be utilized to help settle disputes stemming from operations of Canadian extractive companies abroad. The Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor was created in March 2009 as part of the government’s CSR Strategy for the International Extractive Sector (and I have blogged about the CSR Counceller before). 

The role of the Counsellor is designed as an impartial advisor and facilitator who brings parties together to fix problems and resolve disputes. The new dispute-resolution process is slated to launch in the fall. Additional information, including details of consultation locations, are posted here: Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor.

One of the interesting side questions around the dispute resolution mechanism and the CSR Councellor’s Office many may be this one: will it take the wind out of the controversial Bill C-300? This is a private member’s bill brought by Liberal MP John McKay, about which I blogged previously (Continued Industry Opposition to CSR Bill C-300 in Canada and CSR Bill C-300: A Storm in the Tea Cup?)

The recent article in the Vancouver Sun, rhetorically entitled “Will mining suffer if Bill C-300 becomes law?”,  notes that Bill C-300 is before the Foreign Affairs and International Development Committee, and that it could be back in the House for a vote before the summer recess.

Do you think that the role of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor will weaken or perhaps even make Bill C-300 obsolete?

Mehrdad Nazari is a Senior ESIA and CSR Advisor at PRIZMA.

A few days ago, I was listening to a session of NPR’s All Things Considered about the devastation of the Ixtoc One oil spill disaster and felt an unpleasant sense of déjà vu.

The NPR interview detailed the impact of the drilling platform explosion in the Gulf of Mexico some 30 years ago. The platform was located in the Bay of Campeche in the southern portion of the Gulf of Mexico, about 50 miles from shore. The wellhead began spewing thousands of barrels of crude each day into the sea. It took 10 months to cap the well, and the oil tainted more than 150 miles of Texas coastline.

In 2003, I wrote an article entitled “The transboundary EIA convention in the context of private sector operations co-financed by an International Financial Institution,” which was published in the Environmental Impact Assessment Review. The paper was based on two case studies involving offshore oil field developments in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, both littoral states of the Caspian Sea. The projects’ Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) indicated that major and unmitigated oil spills could potentially result in trans-boundary impacts.

At the time of project/financing review, neither Azerbaijan nor Turkmenistan were Parties to the 1991 Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context, better known as the Espoo Convention.This UN Convention lays out the obligation of states to consult each other on all major projects under consideration that are likely to have significant environmental impact across boundaries. So, somewhat unconventional approaches were taken to follow ‘the spirit’ of the Espoo Convention and bring about information sharing and collaboration between littoral states of the Caspian Sea to also deal with potential for large scale oil spills. Both countries have since also become parties to the Espoo Convention and have been in regional environmental programs, including those related to oil spill response planning.

So how does this all relate to the Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon disaster – now more popularly known as the BP spill? The size and duration of the oil spill, the apparent presence of surface and deep, underwater oil plumes, and presence of strong water currents means that the conditions for creating trans-boundary impacts are all in place (Mexico, Cuba and Caribbean nations). Also, the US never fully adopted the Espoo Convention.

Dr. William Kennedy, Former Executive Director of the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), described in a recent paper prepared for the Environmental Norms, Institutions and Policy Workshop at Stanford University, that the North American governments pursued an Espoo-like agreement through the CEC. Among the areas specifically identified by the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), were firm commitment to “consider and develop” recommendations with respect to an agreement on trans-boundary environmental impact assessment. In 1997, a “Draft North American Agreement on Trans-boundary Environmental Impact Assessment” was published. However, the negotiations fell apart in 1999.

I wonder if the scale, impact and outrage associated with the on-going spill will revive some of the stalled efforts to bring about better trans-boundary EIAs. This could contribute to better , notification, public consultation and collaboration and probably improve response to large scale emergencies with potential for trans-boundary impacts.

Similarly, I wonder if the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) and similar local, national and regional “oil clubs” may need to step it up a notch. They may need to consider pooling significant additional resources to seriously update and scale up technologies and equipment to deal with the sorts disastrous events we are witnessing in the Golf of Mexico today.

During the March 2010 PDAC exploration and mining convention in Toronto, the Export Development Canada (EDC), hosted an event entitled “Who are you and what have you done with my banker?” This event took a ‘process-oriented’ look at how the environmental and social requirements for various sources of capital for mining and metal projects are integrated into due diligence and decision making processes, and what that means for sponsors seeking project finance and political risk insurance.

During his presentation, John Middleton of the IFC highlighted that the topic of ‘Consent,’ was deliberately not adopted when the IFC Performance Standards were developed and launched in 2006. However, this topic is now back on the table during the on-going review process of the IFC Performance Standards (see also my previous blog: Review of 3 years of IFC Performance Standards).  

It is not surprising that Indigenous People/affected communities want to be able to have a say about if, what and how development should take place. Similarly, the extractive industry is concerned about their perception of veto power embodied by the world ‘Consent’ and how this might be used (or misused) to dilute their legal titles and undermine their investments.

There is already precedence set on using the term ‘Consent’ by another multilateral financial institution: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It’s 2008 Environmental and Social Policy and associated Performance Requirements, which are largely modeled after the IFC Performance Standards, the EBRD refers to specific vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. EBRD now requires that the prior informed consent of affected Indigenous Peoples is required for specified project-related activities.

There is another fascinating aspect about the concepts of Broad Community Support, which can exist even if not everybody approves, and Consent, which may be offered through an MOU or similar process and can also exist when not everybody supports a project. These concepts remind me of a marriage. Good ones contain an implicit need to earn support/consent which does not end with a signed paper – it has to be continuously earned and strengthened to withstand the ups and downs of real life – warts and all.

Genesis

Responding to continued criticism by NGOs, the World Bank Group (WBG) launched its Extractive Industry Review in 2001. One outcome of this review was a major overhaul of the procedures and standards of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the WBG focused on private sector developments. IFC’s Performance Standards were published in 2006.

 Significance

The IFC Performance Standards replaced the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies for private sector operations. Also, the Equator Principles  emerged as a derivative of the IFC Performance Standards. To date, the Equator Principles have been adopted by over 60 financial institutions involved in project finance. This includes key Export Credit Agencies, such as Export Development Canada (EDC), which reported a business volume in the extractive sector exceeding CAN$27 billion in 2008 (IFC: US$1.34 billion).

Chapter & Verse

The IFC Performance Standards (PS) are organized in eight chapters (46 pages). Their self-explanatory headings are listed below:

• PS 1: Social and Environmental Assessment and Management Systems
• PS 2: Labor and Working Conditions
• PS 3: Pollution Prevention and Abatement
• PS 4: Community Health, Safety and Security
• PS 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement
• PS 6: Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management
• PS 7: Indigenous Peoples
• PS 8: Cultural Heritage

Extractive projects often trigger most if not all of the above listed Performance Standards, requiring comprehensive environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) studies. The IFC Performance Standards are complemented by additional tools. These include detailed Guidance Notes on the IFC Performance Standards (178 pages, updated in July 2007), generic and sector specific Environmental, Health & Safety (EHS) Guidelines, and a series of valuable Good Practice Documents. Selected topics which typically result in major discussions during my workshops and course are highlighted below.

FPIC & BCS

The IFC Performance Standards require a very participative approach in terms of stakeholder engagement. This approach should ensure Free (of intimidation and coercion), Prior (timely and relevant disclosure), and Informed Consultation (understandable and accessible) – together commonly referred to as FPIC – with project affected communities. Project developers are further expected to secure Broad Community Support (BCS). This can be present and demonstrated even if some individuals or groups object to a project. IFC’s guidelines provide a series of tests to help examine and demonstrate if a project has met FPIC and secured BCS.

Health, Safety & Security

Project developers are expected to evaluate and mitigate the risks to health and safety of affected communities during the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of a project. Safeguarding of personnel and property should be carried out in a legitimate manner that minimizes risks to the community’s safety and security, and safeguards human rights. Here, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights provides an internationally accepted framework relevant to the extractive sector. Dealing with these issues in post-conflict states or large-scale artisanal mining context can be particularly challenging.

 Biodiversity & GHG

In view of risks and vulnerability of biodiversity and natural resources, mitigation measures may be required even if project-impacted habitats have been previously disturbed or are not legally protected. Additional requirements include the need to evaluate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (threshold: 100,000 tons CO2 equivalent per year). Importantly, the concept of offsets has been introduced. This expands the strategic options available to project developers to address specific issues of concerns (see also Mining Magazine article Biodiversity Offsets in Mining).

Involuntary Resettlement (Resettlment Action Plan)

In addition to risks to livelihood of affected communities, resettlement programs can also be associated with significant costs, delays and reputational damage to project developers. Related IFC Performance Standards are complex and triggered by both physical displacement of people and by adverse livelihood impacts (economic displacement). Eligibility for resettlement assistance and compensation may exist even in the absence of lack of legal titles, such as the case with customary land use and communal ownership by Indigenous Peoples. 

Revisions in Progress

In September 2009, the IFC launched a revision process of the IFC Performance Standards. An updated framework is expected to be released by early 2011. Expectations for clarification and changes are contained in the IFC’s Progress Report on Phase I of Consultation, published in January 2010.

In addition to changes related to human rights, Indigenous People, FPIC, climate change and water, I would also expect to see the references to and integration of other important tools and guidelines related to the extractive sector. Those which have also been included in the Canadian Government’s March 2009 CSR Strategy include the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, and the GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Framework (see also related Mining Magazine article ‘Sustainability Reporting using GRI: Lessons Learned’).

Readiness Assessment

The introduction of the IFC Performance Standards has been a fairly recent phenomenon. ‘Local EIAs’ (environmental impact assessments), designed primarily to satisfy local permitting requirements, may fall short of being ‘bankable.’ Learning from CFOs, Readiness Assessments are being used as a tool to help identify gaps, improve processes and documentation, and provide training to key staff in order to simplify and shorten the due diligence process applied by lenders and investors. 

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank contributors and co-presenters of my courses on IFC Performance Standards and Equator Principles: Jamila Abassi, John Aronson, Dr. Helena Barton, Dr. Martin Birley, Kevin Bortz, Kevin D’Souza, Art Fitzgerald, Wayne Forman, Dr. William Kennedy, Timothy Murphy, Dr. Don Proebstel – and all the course participants who generously shared their own knowledge and insights.

Note: This article was published in the March 2010 issue of the Mining.com Magazine and can be downloaded here: IFC Performance Standards – Mining Magazine March 2010 (PDF, 120 KB).

About Author

Mehrdad Nazari is Senior ESIA & CSR Advisor at Prizma, providing training and advisory services related to IFC Performance Standards, Equator Principles and Sustainability Reporting. He was previously a Principal Environmental Specialist at the European Bank, CSR Research Director at CoreRatings (now DNV/Innovest/Riskmatrics) and Project Manager with Dames & Moore (now URS).

A look at IFC/MIGA’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) office and European Bank’s Independent Recourse Mechanism (IRM) could be useful. The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) describes itself as the independent recourse mechanism for the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The CAO responds to complaints from project-affected communities with the goal of enhancing social and environmental outcomes on the ground. Since being set up in 2000, the CAO received a total of 110 new complaints, of which almost 40% were deemed to be ineligible. The lion share of over 60% of (eligible?) complaints related to the extractive Oil, Gas, Mining, and Chemicals sector. Interestingly, that sector only accounts for less that 7% of IFC’s investments in FY 2009. During the same period, the COA had an administrative budget of over $3.3 million and employed 11 staff members (excluding additional consultants involved reviewing and mediating CAO’s case load and contributing to its advisory notes). Procedural changes adopted by CAO after reviewing lessons learned include limiting the time available for dispute resolution to 120 days (unless participating parties agree to an extension) before a complaint/case is passed on to a compliance review (audit).

The European Bank (EBRD) established its Independent Recourse Mechanism (IRM) in 2003. A recent review suggested that EBRD’s IRM Rules of Procedures are considered by many to be less than “user friendly” and are also not well known (either within or outside of the EBRD). After four years of operation of the IRM, EBRD recorded only 5 eligible complaints. (This is why EBRD’s board decided to transition the IRM to a Project Complaint Mechanism - more on that later.) 

What does the experience with CAO and IRM mean in terms of Bill C-300? The dministrative processes would need to balance frivolous misuse with reasonable access. With that balnce, an initial case load of a dozen or two per year could perhaps be expected. Also, a substantial budget allocation may be required for DFAIT to handle the additional workload. How many annual complaints would you be expecting?

You may also be interested in reviewing my related blog post: CSR Bill C-300 is A Storm in the Tea Cup?

IFC’s new framework came into effect in April 2006. IFC’s review captured statistics and lessons from three years of implementation. For the period covered in IFC’s report, approximately 560 projects had been presented to IFC’s Board for approval, amounting to more than $25 billion in investments.

In IFC’s client surveys, over 60 percent of respondents said the cost associated with meeting IFC Performance Standard requirements is higher than the average cost of meeting social and environmental requirements for their sector. But only 21 percent said the cost of PS implementation might negatively influence future decisions to work with IFC.

In IFC’s report, the key challenges identified with regard to the IFC Performance Standards include management of global environmental issues such as climate change and biodiversity protection; and social development issues, including  consultation, broad community support and human rights.  

Of particular relevance to the mining and oil and gas sector are probably these two topics and related commentary:

Meeting the full requirements of Performance Standard 5 (Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement) on resettlement continued to be very challenging. Meeting the requirement related to displaced people who have no recognizable legal right or claim to the land remains a difficult area for private sector clients.

IFC Performance Standard 6 (Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management) seem to pose significant challenges. Here, the challenge of collection of, or access to, biodiversity baseline information (multi-seasonal, geographical coverage) was highlighted. IFC will be re-examining its critical habitat definition.

What is your experience working with IFC and the IFC Performance Standards? Helpful, headaches or dealbreaker? IFC’s 3 year review report can be found here. Links to tow of my recent blog posts about IFC Performance Standards are copied below.

• Equator Principles – Progress or Failure?
• Revise or Mainstream the IFC Performance Standards?

CFB website contains a lists or proposed and/or closed deals since October 2009. The mining list contains over 250 entries. The 35 entries which exceed $10 million are listed further below (sorted by deal size and company name). An interesting question to pursue further would be if all the projects underlying these finance deals are aligned with Equator Principles and the IFC Performance Standards. Perhaps an opportunity for value-added research and advocacy efforts…

The original list, which includes addition information such as regions, mining can be accessed for mining here and its equivalent for oil and gas is posted here. Are these sources of information being used? Are you aware of similar other sources of information which could be used?

Proposed and/or closed deals > ca $10 million, sorted by deal size

Proposed and/or closed deals > ca $10 million, sorted by company name